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ABSTRACT: This paper offers a new approach to the political economy of
armament, focusing on the relationship between military spending and
differential accumulation in mature capitalist economies. Applied to the
"model" case of Israel, our analysis suggests that the militarization of
Israel’s economy since the late 1960s occurred within a growing
dichotomy between large and small firms. The econometric model shows
that the "military-bias" of Israeli industry raised the profits of the large
corporate conglomerates but constrained and even lowered those of
smaller companies.
The 1980s marked a significant watershed in the international
military economy. For the first time in recent memory, world
military budgets (measured in constant dollars) moved
downward, initially in the developing countries, and then,
toward the end of the decade, also in the developed world. This
tendency was further enhanced in the early 1990s by the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Soon,
it became fashionable to talk about a forthcoming &dquo;peace
- dividend.&dquo; The hope was that, with receding world tensions,
economic resources which previously were tied up to defense
needs would now help rejuvenate the sluggish western
economies and facilitate the daunting task of cleaning and
protecting a deteriorating global environment. Yet these
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sanguine expectations could prove too optimistic. Global
military expenditures remain very large at about $870 billion
a year, or roughly 5.7% of the world’s GNP (U. S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, 1993-1994: 43). This means that,
despite recent declines in annual spending, the international
weaponry arsenal still continues to grow at a rate sufficiently
rapid to intensify existing conflicts and induce new ones; if
those conflicts are allowed to develop, they could then reverse
the very trend of falling military budgets. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1992: 418),
there are currently over 30 major conflicts waging worldwide,
and so far there is little reason to expect a significant reduction
in that number. Indeed, some regions - particularly
South-East Asia and the Middle East - have recently
embarked on a renewed path of rearmament, with the obvious
implications for future instability.
Given the issues at stake - notably, global peace and
security, economic prosperity and a sustainable environment
- the future of armament is clearly a crucial question. The
prospects for a less militarized world depend to a large extent
on the developed countries. According to (U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1993-1994: 2, 14), in 1993 these
countries accounted for about 75% of global military
expenditures and 92% of all arms exports, and, although
armed conflicts and wars often occur in the developing world,
the political and economic role of the industrialized countries
is clearly paramount. How likely, then, are these countries to
continue and reduce their military production and exports?
The answer to this question is of course highly complex, yet
one aspect looms large and that is the two-way interaction
between arms production and business structure. Over time,
military spending tends to affect the evolution of the corporate
sector and alter the balance of power between its constituent
components. These changes need not be significant of course,
but when they are, one of their possible consequences is to
augment the political clout of some of the affected groups,
perhaps to the extent that they can then influence the course
of military budgets and arms exports. Thus, any attempt to
understand the development of military spending and, by
extension, the prospect for future changes, should take into
consideration these structural consequences of the war
economy.
In this paper, we offer a new analytical approach to the
relationships between military expenditures and economic
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structure in mature capitalist countries. In developing this
framework, we focus on the &dquo;model&dquo; case of Israel. The Israeli
example is instructive for a number of different reasons. First,
Israel experienced significant changes in the level of military
expenditures at the same time that its corporate sector was
undergoing drastic restructuring. Second, these developments
were very rapid and intense, thus heightening important
turning points and crucial political considerations that
otherwise could go undetected. Third, by virtue of its key role
in the Middle East, the Israeli case may help shed more light
on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the prospects
for its reconciliation. And, fourth, the apparent link between
military spending and the transformation of Israel from a
developing country to a mature industrial economy may carry
interesting implications for other countries that are going
through a comparable transition and face similar problems.
Theoretical and empirical attempts to deal with military
spending are usually based on some explicit or implicit
assumption regarding the underlying structure of society. One
approach is to begin by assuming that the actions of a &dquo;nation&dquo;
reflect some commonly shared set of interests. In this aggregate
, framework, it is customary to subdivide society into two
systems of &dquo;economics&dquo; and &dquo;politics.&dquo; The economic system, so
it is assumed, would guarantee universal welfare if only it were
allowed to function &dquo;efficiently.&dquo; The political system may
undermine that efficiency when it seeks to achieve additional
goals such as &dquo;national security&dquo; but fails to find the optimal
rate of substitution between security and economic growth
along the nation’s production-possibility frontier. Seen from
this perspective, military spending appears to be governed by
politicians who are free to choose between a rational action
toward &dquo;correct&dquo; decisions, or a passionate behavior leading to
inevitable &dquo;mistakes.&dquo;~ The literature on defense economics in
Israel is dominated almost exclusively by these presumptions
and is preoccupied with the &dquo;optimal&dquo; choice between security
and alternative economic goals. The seminal article by Berglas
(1983), for example, attempted to weigh the economic &dquo;burden&dquo;
of military spending, while Sadan (1985) expanded the
1The notion that politicians are indeed free to choose and hence tend
to "err" is deeply embedded in the historical theories of Schumpeter
(1919) and Tuchman (1984). On the "mistake theory," see Barnet (1972:
7, 125).
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framework to assess the security burden on the social system
as a whole.2
An alternative disaggregate perspective is to recognize the
primacy of social conflict as a factor affecting military
spending. The roots of this approach could be traced to early
Marxist and institutional writers who attempted to explain
military spending as part of a dialectical process of capitalist
crises. An important school within this literature focused on
the tendency toward under consumption and the rise of
monopoly capital. The first contributors in that direction -
notably Hilferding (1910), Luxemburg (1913) and Veblen
(1904, 1923) - tied the increase in military spending and the
tendency toward aggressive foreign policy with the process of
corporate concentration in advanced capitalist economies.
Later writers, such as Kalecki (1971, 1972), Steindl (1952),
Tsuru (1961) and Baran and Sweezy (1966), argued that the
rising &dquo;degree of monopoly,&dquo; created a &dquo;tendency of surplus to
rise&dquo; but without a corresponding increase in potential &dquo;offsets
to savings.&dquo; This, in their opinion, led to the growing use of
defense spending - or what Gold (1977) later labeled as
&dquo;military Keynesianism&dquo; - in order to prevent declines in
aggregate output and employment. Some contemporary
contributors, like O’Connor (1973) and Griffin, Devine and
Wallace (1982), have taken the argument a step further,
suggesting that government involvement in general, and
military expenditures in particular, were affected not by overall
macroeconomic needs, but by the specific requirements of
dominant economic groups.
Notably, both the aggregate and disaggregate approaches
focus on the effect of an underlying structure on the behavior
of overall economic aggregates. The first of these approaches
views military spending as related to the macroeconomic and
macropolitical preferences of a nation, while the second
associates such spending with an antagonistic economic and
power structure. Yet, both frameworks are to a certain extent
unidirectional. They seek to explore the effect of a given
structure on the behavior of military expenditures and tend to
ignore the potential impact of military spending on structure.
There is, of course, no presumption that underlying structures
2The dilemma over the "right" allocation of resources underlies
numerous other studies such as Barkai (1981), Gilshon (1986), Gross
(ed.) (1975), Hassid and Lesser (1981), Katzir and Shadmi (1984) and
Zusmman (1984).
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remain unaltered. Instead, the implicit assumption is that, for
the purpose of analysis, structure could be taken as given.
However, this convenient avenue could prove misleading. The
process of restructuring may not be as exogenous as some
researchers tend to assume, and whenever this happens to be
the case, there is a need for a broader, double-sided approach
that recognizes not only the impact of structure on military
spending, but also the effect of military expenditures on
structural change.
One of the first scholars to stress this latter link between
military spending and changes in the structure of economic
and political power was Kalecki (1964, 1967). He predicted
that military expenditures on the Vietnam War would shift the
center of business power from &dquo;civilian&dquo; to &dquo;military&dquo; industries
and that this restructuring would increase the influence of
&dquo;angry elements&dquo; within the U.S. elites. The experience since
the late 1960s lends considerable support to this contention.
First, the share of large armament firms in the net profit of the
&dquo;big economy&dquo; in the U.S. seems to have increased more or less
continuously between the late 1960s and the late 1980s.
Second, many large firms that were traditionally limited to
. civilian markets, have gradually increased their reliance on
military-related production.3 We believe a comparable (though
by no means identical) restructuring has occurred in the Israeli 
I
case.
Figures 1 describes the changing significance of military
spending in Israel between 1960 and 1985. Expressed as a
share of GDP, domestic military spending (which includes local
procurement and wages but not military imports) has risen
sharply from about 6% in the mid-1960s, to over 17% by the
mid-1970s and then declined to a lower share of about 15%.
Another viewpoint, which focuses only on net sellable output
(with the exclusion of replacement investment, rent and
3Based on data published in the Fortune 500 listings and in the U.S.
Department of Defense’s 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar
Volume of Prime Contract Awards, the 16 largest Pentagon contractors
increased their share in the net profit of the 500 largest industrial
corporations from 4.1% in 1969, to a record 10.7% in 1985. The
emergence and consolidation of an "armament core" of large U.S.-based
corporations is explored in Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989), Nitzan,




The Israeli War Economy
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel.
government wage payments as described in section 3), shows
a dramatically different picture, however, with the ratio
between overall military production and overall net civilian
production rising more or less continuously from about 10% in
the mid-1960s, to over 50% by the mid-1980s.4 These changes
were accompanied, since the early 1970s, by a severe
stagflation, characterized by rapid inflation, stagnating or
falling output, declines in investment and deteriorating public
services. In parallel to these macroeconomic changes, there
were dramatic transformations affecting the underlying
structure of the business sector. Perhaps the most significant
of those changes was the emergence of differential capital
accumulation - that is, a combination of rising profits at the
corporate core together with stagnating or falling profits in the
rest of the business sector. The consequence of this differential
process was the progressive consolidation of the &dquo;big economy,&dquo; &dquo;
whereby the five largest Israeli conglomerates have increased
their share of the economy’s net profit from less than 3% in the
4In the third section, this ratio is defined as equal to
(Dmil+X) &divide; (Dciv+X).
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early 1970s, to over 20% by the early 1980sl (See Figure 2
below.)
Our purpose in this article is to explore the relationship
between the process of differential capital accumulation and
the development of military spending in Israel, focusing
specifically on the economy’s &dquo;militarization phase&dquo; between
1966 and 1985. To the extent that such a relationship exists,
it must be situated within a broader context of economic and
political changes which occurred over that period. Thus, in the
second section, we outline the dual-economy structure of
Israel. We argue that the historical evolution of this structure
and the emergence of its leading core firms via differential
accumulation has been affected by the macroeconomic
development of Israel, particularly (thought not only) by its
growing &dquo;military bias&dquo; toward defense-related production. The
third section offers a new analytical framework for relating
macroeconomics and market structure. Specifically, we
establish a self-contained set of definitional equations
describing the quantitative relationship between the aggregate
categories of the national accounts on the one hand, and the
differential accumulation of net profit by large and small firms
. on the other. The novelty here is twofold. First, instead of
looking at conventional variables such as sales, value-added or
employment, we make net profit and the distribution of profit
the focus of our structural analysis. Second, rather than
groping for miscellaneous determinants of differential
accumulation, we construct a closed system - one in which
the micro redistribution of profit is part of the same
transformation that also alters the macro relationships among
the different components of the national accounts. In the
fourth section, we use this analytical framework as a basis for
developing an econometric model. Applied to the Israeli
economy, this model is then employed to evaluate the relative
importance of military-related production in the differential
evolution of Israel’s market structure. In concluding, we
comment on the broader significance of our study for
understanding the long-term development of the Israeli
economy, and on the prospects for its future demilitarization.
THE ISRAELI DUAL-ECONOMY
The core of Israel’s big economy comprises five corporate
conglomerates - Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, Israel Discount
Bankholding (IDBH), Koor and Clal. These groups are directly
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or indirectly involved in all key sectors of the economy - from
raw materials, through transportation, to production,
marketing, services and finance. Their origins predate
Independence in 1948, and their evolution has been marked
by strong and symbiotic relations with the government. Over
the years, cross-ownership, kinship, status and cultural ties
among the owners and managers of these companies have
slowly consolidated this group into a single &dquo;core,&dquo; which in
relative terms is probably much more cohesive than its U.S.
counterpart (as described in Borwring 1986, for instance). This
cohesiveness is reflected in the high correlation exhibited
between the performance of the different groups - in sales,
value-added, taxes, subsidies executive compensation and,
most significantly, net profits.
The core conglomerates are surrounded by a satellite belt of
somewhat smaller firms, usually occupying a leading or even
monopoly position in a particular industry. Most of these
satellite firms are closely linked to one or more of the core
conglomerates through business, credit and ownership ties,
and often exhibit similar financial performance (Rowley,
Bichler and Nitzan 1988, and Levi 1979, 1981). On the outer
&dquo;periphery&dquo; of the Israeli economy we can find a multitude of
much smaller corporations, proprietorships and partnerships
which usually operate a single establishment. Unlike the
groups of the &dquo;big economy,&dquo; the &dquo;small-economy&dquo; firms
function independently from one another, with only loose
business and professional associations. Most interestingly,
although they operate in the same macroeconomic
environment, the &dquo;big&dquo; and &dquo;small&dquo; economies demonstrate
different and often diametrically opposed business
performances - particularly in terms of value added and net
profits (Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan, 1988).
Differential Capital Accumulation and the Aggregate
Concentration of Profit
In analyzing business structure, the conventional approach is
to concentrate on the size-distribution of corporate assets,
5For a comprehensive statistical analysis of the corporate
conglomerates, see Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1988). The history of
Israel’s business elites and its relationship with the political and military
elites is examined in Frenkel and Bichler (1984). The interaction between
the "big economy" and the government in Israel was first analyzed in
Aharoni (1976).
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sales, value-added or employees. In this article, however, we
prefer to focus on the less conventional but perhaps more
useful variable of net profit. The reasons for this choice are
relatively straightforward, but given the common neglect of
profit, a brief elaboration may prove useful. In the modern
system of business enterprise, the number of employees,
value-added and revenues from sales are merely means toward
the final goal of capital accumulation. Furthermore, even the
value of assets (or equity) - the professed end of accumulation
- is not an independent quantity but rather a capitalization of
earning capacity. In other words, stripped to its bare
essentials, the quest for accumulation is ultimately a pursuit
of net profit. At the same time, the economic and political
power needed to appropriate future profits often hinges on the
corporation’s previous earnings, so that profit is not only the
end, but also the most substantial means of business activity.
Indeed, in the modern business world, the final yardstick for
corporate success derives not from the expansion of sales,
value-added or employment, but from the growth of net
income.
Taking this reasoning one step further, the main focus of our
. analysis is on the related concepts of differential accumulation
and the aggregate concentration of profit.6 For the modem
corporation, the benchmark for assessing success or failure is
rarely the &dquo;maximum&dquo; rate of profit (which is always unknown),
but rather the all-pervasive &dquo;average&dquo; or &dquo;normal&dquo; rate of
return. In the context of large-scale business enterprise, the
main goal is to &dquo;beat the average.&dquo; Ultimately, the large f-irm
seeks to have its profit rise faster than the average - that is,
to achieve a differential rate accumulation. But exceeding the
average pace of accumulation is tantamount to raising one’s
share in the overall flow of profit, so, in the final analysis,
differential accumulation and rising aggregate concentration of
profit are two sides of the same process.
6Note that the concept of "accumulation" is used here in a pecuniary,
not material sense. The monetary value of capital may of course be
affected by the material augmentation of industrial equipment; from a
business perspective, however, such tangible expansion is merely one
way &mdash; and certainly not the only one &mdash; toward the more fundamental
goal of pecuniary accumulation. The pivotal significance of differential
pecuniary accumulation in the evolution of mature capitalism is
developed in Nitzan (1992) and Nitzan and Bichler (1995).
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This vantage point is highly significant for our purpose
because, by concentrating on differential accumulation and the
distribution of profit, we are effectively looking right at the very
essence of business restructuring. Other aspects of
restructuring, such as changes in industrial concentration,
technological superiority, political ties, or international
competition are of course very important, but only as means
toward the higher end of differential accumulation. These
considerations fit neatly with our own theoretical framework
for linking macroeconomic and structural changes developed
in the third and fourth sections. Our analysis of income and
expenditure flows makes net profit the proper variable of
choice, whereas the dual-economy disaggregation centers
around the differential aspect of accumulation and the
resulting changes in the aggregate concentration of profit.
Macroeconomic History in Structural Retrospect
The interaction between macroeconomic development and
differential accumulation in Israel could be perceived as
belonging to two distinct &dquo;regimes&dquo;: (1) The period between
1955 and 1972, characterized by rapid macroeconomic growth
and &dquo;latent&dquo; structural consolidation, and (2) the post-1973
era, marked by severe stagnation and an &dquo;open&dquo; process of
differential accumulation. (The early 1990s may mark the
beginning of a third regime of &dquo;peace dividends&dquo; as argued in
Nitzan and Bichler 1996a, 1996b) These broad contours are
illustrated in Figure 2, where we contrast the economy’s GNP
growth (expressed as a five-year moving average) with the rate
of aggregate concentration as measured by the share of the five
core conglomerates in the net profit of the entire business
sector. During the 1955-1972 period, the economy expanded
at an average annual rate of 10%. The profit share of the core
conglomerates, on the other hand, was relatively low and,
between 1966 and 1972, never exceeded 3%. (Although prior
data are unavailable, the profit share must have been even
lower during earlier years, when the large conglomerates were
just beginning to consolidate.) The post-1973 period was
fundamentally different: there was a marked drop in growth
rates, to an average of 3% between 1973 and 1985, and as the
stagnation lingered, the profit share of the core firms started to
rise rapidly, climbing as we already noted from less than 3%
in the early 1970s, to an average of 15% during the early
1980s. The distinction between these two &dquo;regimes&dquo; is
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Figure 2
Macroeconomic Growth and Differential Accumulation
~ 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel; company annual reports.
important, and we turn to consider it now, beginning with the
first period. 
’
Until 1972, economic growth in Israel was disproportionately
affected by two &dquo;external&dquo; stimuli: (1) the unilateral capital
inflow of German compensation between 1955 and 1965, and
(2) the &dquo;Palestinians boom&dquo; in the immediate years after the
1967 War. During the 1955-1965 period, unilateral transfers
from Germany accounted for most of the capital import, and,
until the early 1960s, their levels were almost identical to the
annual change in GNP. Indeed, the end of these transfers in
1965 was followed by the severe recession of 1966-1967. The
situation changed again in 1968, when the Israeli market
suddenly expanded to include 1 million new consumers from
the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Furthermore, the postwar years, roughly until 1973, saw very
rapid increases in the number of Palestinian employees
working in Israel - from zero to over 60,000 in just five years
- and a consequent increase in purchasing power. This
combination of an overnight expansion of markets and a rapid
process of proletarianization had a decisive multiplier effect on
the Israeli economy. Indeed, by 1974, when growth in the
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number of Palestinians working in Israel dropped sharply, the
economy reverted back to stagnation.~
These external impetuses to growth worked to lessen the
process of aggregate concentration, mainly through their
positive impact on the expansion of small firms. Yet,
underlying the overall growth process, one could (in retrospect)
identify the early emergence of the would-be conglomerates.
Consolidation in the financial sector began already during the
1950s,8 while the amalgamation of industrial concerns began
in the 1960s, with the government’s gradual retreat from
manufacturing. Although the large conglomerates remained
relatively small in quantitative terms until the 1970s, they were
nevertheless establishing and fortifying special relationships
with the government and among themselves.9 Particularly
significant in that respect was the recessionary period of
1966-1967, which enabled the emerging core groups to
diversify their holdings and increase their mutual integration.
This ’latent&dquo; reorganization has slowly altered the underlying
institutional structure of the Israeli economy, paving the way
for a new regime of &dquo;open&dquo; differential accumulation and
persistent stagnation. Following the 1973 collapse of the
&dquo;Palestinian boom,&dquo; it became increasingly clear that the Israeli
economy could not grow &dquo;on its own.&dquo; Initially, the recession
was blamed on the 1973 oil crisis, but as stagnation continued
to linger, economists started pointing their fingers at chronic
&dquo;market imperfections&dquo;: reckless politicians, a socialist
tradition that promoted excessive government intervention, an
omnipotent labor union, a commitment to full employment and
7Data on the number of Palestinians working in Israel are from the
Statistical Abstract of Israel for 1983 (774-775) and for 1986 (770). Note
that this view, which attributes the post-1967 economic growth to the
rapid expansion of markets and proletarianization of the Palestinian
population, has for long been rejected by many Israeli economists (see,
for example, Tuma 1989: 139). Interestingly, though, this hypothesis
received some indirect support recently, when many observers noted the
detrimental impact on the Israeli economy of declining Palestinian
employment and purchasing power during the Intifada.
8See Elizur (1984) and Greenberg (1986). According to Heth (1966),
there were 70 commercial banks and 100 savings and loans cooperatives
operating in Palestine of the 1930s. By the early 1970s, there remained
only five banking groups, of which three were part of the large
conglomerates.
9Cf. Frenkel and Bichler (1984), and Shapiro (1977, 1984).
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various international obligations which ailed the economy and
&dquo;misallocated&dquo; its resources. 10 What these explanations tend to
miss, however, is the intimate link which exists in Israel (and
elsewhere) between macroeconomic &dquo;distortions&dquo; and business
restructuring.
The allocation of resources during the 1950s and 1960s was
not even distributed across the business sector. For example,
the &dquo;Sapir Method&dquo; of allocating the German transfer payments
(named after Pinchas Sapir, the Labor Minister of Finance) was
to supply cheap capital to selected business groups and
entrepreneurs, which were considered conducive to industrial
development and employment growth. This kind of government
&dquo;intervention&dquo; was not a random violation of competitive
allocation; instead, it followed a systematic pattern that
contributed toward the progressive concentration of the Israeli
economy. 1 1 Initially, the negative effect on growth was
relatively mild. The redistribution of income in favor of selected
business groups and away from smaller firms and labor tended
to curtail mass consumption, but given that capital formation
was closely administered by the government, the shortfall in
the demand for wage goods was compensated by higher levels
of investment. The problem arose in the early 1970s, when the
external sources of growth dried up. By that time, the
&dquo;misallocation&dquo; of resources had already grown into a rigid set
of institutional arrangements between the government and the
key business players, arrangements that could no longer be
easily altered. It was from that point onward that the
dual-market distinction between the &dquo;big&dquo; and &dquo;small&dquo;
economies became crucial to understanding Israel’s broad
economic development.
10See, for instance, Ben-Porath (1986), Bruno (1989) and Sharkansky
(1987). An earlier analysis is given in Patinkin (1965).
11The "Sapir Method" and some of its important structural
ramifications are examined in Barkai (1968).
12A parallel process of segmentation has been proposed by Farjoun
(1978, 1980, 1983), who described the growing dichotomy between the
primary and secondary labor markets. With the 1967 occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the concurrent militarization of the "big
economy," writes Farjoun (1978: 4), "came a growing need for a cheap,
mobile labor force, with no social rights; a free labor force in the classical
meaning of the term." This was achieved by the proletarianization of the
Palestinian population, which was rapidly becoming the main labor pool
for a growing number of "small-economy" sectors, such as agriculture,
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Following Olson (1982), one could argue that, by 1973, Israel
has accumulated a dense network of &dquo;distribution coalitions&dquo;
with little incentive to promote macroeconomic growth. The
long period of &dquo;administered&dquo; capital formation helped to
consolidate the relative position of large firms, but, without
comparable increases in real wages, it also created a serious
predicament of excess capacity (that is, an excess over what
could be sold at profitable prices). With the subsiding of the
post-1967 boom, there was a dramatic decline of net
investment - from 21 1 billion New Israeli Shekels (NIS) in
1973, to 12 billion NIS in 1978, to 5 billion NIS in 1986 (all in
1980 prices) - as the &dquo;big economy&dquo; shifted its focus from
productive to distributional activities. ~ 3
This transition consisted of three principal developments.
First, there was a surge of mergers and acquisitions, mostly by
the core conglomerates (particularly Koor, Clal and IDBH), but
also by some of the satellite firms (like Danot, Dubek and
Elite). The ensuing process of concentration worked to reduce
both excess capacity and competition simultaneously, which in
turn helped maintain and even increase profit margins on
lower volumes. Second, the decline in industrial &dquo;offsets to
savings&dquo; diverted funds to the stock and bond markets, causing
a rapid speculative inflation in the value of financial assets.
With the prices of these assets rising even faster than prices of
goods and services, the ratio of stock market capitalization to
GNP rose from less than 8% in 1973, to 99% in 1982.14
Particularly affected were the assets of the core conglomerates:
according to the Commission of Inquiry to the Regulation of Bank
Shares (Bejsky, Ziller, Hirsh, Sarnat and Friedman 1986: 61),
shares of the three largest banks, which accounted for 7% of
the aggregate value of all financial assets in 1973, rose to 44%
of that total by 1982, and it is thus hardly surprising that the
large conglomerates became the largest owners (and
construction, services and low-technology civilian manufacturing. The
other side of this process was that the "big economy," particularly its
financial and military branches, came to rely solely on a Jewish,
unionized labor force, with relatively extensive social security and wage
rates twice as high as those earned by the Palestinians (17).
13Figures are based on the Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years.
14Data on stock market capitalization are from the Bank of Israel’s
Annual Report 1974, p. 445 and Annual Report 1983, p. 282. GNP figures
are from the Central Bureau of Statistics’ National Accounts, 1972-1985,
p. 166.
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manipulators) of their own stocksl 15 Third, and perhaps most ’
important, was the increasing dependency of the &dquo;big economy&dquo;
on military-related profits.
The &dquo;Military Bias&dquo; &dquo;
Although government policies since the early 1970s enhanced
the extent of mergers and acquisitions as well as the diversion
from industrial to speculative activity, it was defense spending
that, in our view, exerted the most lasting effect on both the
underlying structure of the Israeli economy and its overall
performance. To the extent that the government maintained or
even increased the military-related profitability of the large
firms, it contributed toward undermining the long-term
viability of the Israeli economy. Much like the transformation
of U.S. big business, as predicted by Kalecki (1967) and later
analyzed by Melman (1985), the growing &dquo;military bias&dquo; since
the early 1970s became the dominant structural process of
Israel’s &dquo;big economy.&dquo; This &dquo;military bias&dquo; shifted the industrial
focus toward areas in which Israel did not have and could not
have any competitive edge. It raised the domestic and foreign
debt and increased Israel’s dependence on the United States.
, 
Most significantly, through its effect on the aggregate
concentration of profit, it turned the large conglomerates into
a decisive political force. Indeed, since the early 1980s, a
growing number of mainstream Israeli economists started to t
express concern about the backward link between the &dquo;military
bias&dquo; of Israeli industry and the course of Israel’s foreign policy:
defense spending was no longer seen as a mere political issue,
but also as a reflection of economic pressures exerted by the
&dquo;angry elements&dquo; that came to dominate many boardrooms in
the &dquo;big economy
15On the systematic regulation of stock prices in the Tel-Aviv
Exchange, see also Elizur (1984) and Frenkel and Bichler (1984).
16Although the "militarization" of the Israeli economy and its broader
political-economic implications have never been systematically analyzed
in Israel, there are several works that need to be mentioned. Perhaps the
most cited study, by Peri and Neubach (1985), asserted that there exists
in Israel a "military-industrial complex" along the lines proposed by Mills
(1956). Unfortunately, these authors provided no empirical evidence to
substantiate their claim. Another article by Halperin (1987) argued that,
after 1973, Israeli industry underwent a structural change that shifted its
focus toward investing in military production and high-technology
ventures and that this shift has led to permanent stagnation. Yet, here,
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The evolution of military spending in Israel was hence part of
a double-sided structural transformation. On the one hand, the
level of military expenditures was influenced by the progressive
&dquo;military bias&dquo; and increasing concentration of the Israeli
economy. On the other hand, these latter developments were
themselves partly the outcome of high military spending. Given
the attendant difficulty of separating cause from effect within
this intricate historical process, our purpose in the rest of this
paper is primarily descriptive: we seek to unravel the actual
evolution of structural interactions In order to do that, we
develop in the next section an analytical framework that
anchors the process of differential accumulation in the income
and expenditure categories of the national accounts.
THE MACROECONOMICS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE:
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Consider the GDP identity between income and expenditures,
such that
where W is Wages and Salaries, KI is Capital Income, 7N is
Indirect Business Taxes, SUB is Subsidies to Business, D is
Depreciation, C is Private Consumption, I is Gross Investment,
G is Government Consumption Expenditures, X is Exports and
M is Imports. Note that, in this standard definition, Capital
Income (Kl) includes, in addition to the share of capital in
value- added, also Subsidies to Business (SUB) and Direct
Business Taxes (Tc~. A portion of this income - namely, rent
from the ownership of dwellings (I~ - is paid (or imputed)
directly to households that are not considered part of the
business sector. Furthermore, as it stands, KI excludes the
Interest Payments on the Domestic Debt (IDD). In Table 1, we
too, the conclusion was not backed by evidence. A third analysis that
appeared in a series of nine journalistic articles by Frenkel (1982)
examined the complex ties of business, politics, kinship and ideology
existing among Israel’s business, military and political elites, as well as
the relationships of these groups with the elites of the United States.
17For recent attempts to identify the causal "determinants" of Israel’s
military spending, see, for example, McGuire (1982), Mintz and Ward




Net Domestic Product Less Rent 
..., , . :.
defme Net Business Income After Taxes (~ as equal to (KI - R
+ IDD - Td) and substitute 1f for KI. In parallel, we add (-IDD +
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Tc~ to the left-hand side of the national-accounting identity
and, on the right-hand side, deduct R from Private
Consumption &copy; to obtain Private Consumption less Dwellings
(Cld). Next, we substitute Net Investment (In.etj for Gross
Investment (1) in the expenditure side and eliminate
Depreciation (D) from the income side, so both sides are now
equal to the net domestic product less rent. Then, we
decompose Government Consumption Expenditures (G) into
Military Procurement (Gmi~, Civilian Procurement (Gciv),
Military Wages and Salaries (Gwmi~ and Civilian Wages and
Salaries (Gwciv). Finally, we distinguish between Military
Export (Xmi~ and Civilian Export (Xciv), as well as between
Military Import (Mmi~ and Civilian Import (Mciv).
In Table 2, we move everything but z from the left-hand to
the right-hand side and, by rearranging further, get Net
Business Income After Taxes (7r) as a sum of four broad
components: net civilian production (Dciv + Xciv), military
production (Dmil + Xmi~, net government transfers to business
(IDD + SUB - Tc,~ and, finally, business-sector wages and
salaries (-1~Vb).
This definition resembles the early work of Kalecki (1933) on
the &dquo;Determinants of Profits.&dquo; Unlike Kalecki, however, we do
not make a claim for any unidirectional causality here. The net
profit on the left-hand side of Table 4 denotes the source of
accumulation, while the components on the right-hand side
reflect the various modes of accumulation, and, in our opinion,
both were &dquo;determined&dquo; as part of the same historical evolution
of authority/property relationships in Israel.
Decomposition
One way to bring those authority/property relations into the
macroeconomic center-stage is by decomposing 7r into its two
dual-market components: 7rL which denotes the Net Business
Income After Taxes, or net profit, earned by the large firms of
the &dquo;big economy,&dquo; and (Jrs which designates the remaining net
profit going to the smaller, periphery firms. As we argued
earlier, the profits of these two sectors followed distinctly
different patterns, and if this were true for the source of
accumulation, then we should not be surprised to find that the
two sectors also differed in their respective modes of
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accumulation. In operational terms, we could begin by
summarizing Table 4 with Equation (2):
and then break down into:
such that, n = n~ + Tig
One straightforward interpretation for the cri and ~i~
coefficients of Equations (3a) and (3b) is that they represent
non-negative distributive shares. For instance, at would be the
share of the &dquo;big economy&dquo; in Civilian Production for Domestic
Use (Dctu), while P8 would similarly denote the share of the
&dquo;small economy&dquo; in Business-Sector Wages ( Wb). Since the &dquo;big&dquo;
and &dquo;small&dquo; economies comprise the entire business sector, the
sums (ai + ~3l) have unit values. None of these coefficients is
necessarily fixed through time, of course.
The significance of this decomposition becomes apparent
when we relate the disaggregate Equations (3a) and (3b) to the
aggregate Equation (2). In the industrial-organization
literature, the term &dquo;aggregate concentration&dquo; is commonly
used to denote the distributive share of the largest firms in key
variables such as manufacturing output, industrial sales, or
nonfinancial assets. Extending this concept to net business
income after taxes n, we can similarly defme the aggregate
concentration of profit (AG’) as given by the distributive share
of profit going to the &dquo;big economy,&dquo; and a complementary
index for the aggregate dispersion of profit (AD), to denote the
corresponding share going to the remaining smaller firms.
These indices are given by Equations (4a) and (4b),
respectively:
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where AC + AD = 1.
Focusing on Equation (4a), we note that the aggregate
concentration of profit (AG~ could change for two different
reasons. First, it could rise or fall as a consequence of changes
in the ai coefficients, that is, in the distributive shares of the
&dquo;big economy&dquo; in the ith variable. For instance, a ceteris paribus
, 
increase in 
~r1 (the &dquo;big-economy&dquo; share in Civilian Production
for Domestic Use, Dcit~, or in as (its share of Interest Payments
on the Domestic Debt, IDD), would cause AC to rise, while
increases in 
~~ (the &dquo;big-economy&dquo; share of Direct Business
Taxes, 7’d), or in a8 (its share of Business-Sector Wages and
Salaries, Wb), would cause AC to fall. (These developments
would have precisely the opposite effects on the aggregate
dispersion of profit, AD.)
The second source for changes in the aggregate concentration
of profit are variations in the relative weights of the different
variables. To illustrate this impact, assume that al, the share
of the &dquo;big economy&dquo; in Civilian Production for Domestic Use
(Dd4, is fixed at 0.7, while a4, its share in Military Production
for Export (Xmi~, is fixed at 0.9. Now, suppose that, over a
given time interval, the only changes in Equation (4) are a
reduction in Dciu from $15 billion to $14 billion, compensated
by an increase in Xmil from $1 billion to $2 billion. Following
these changes, (7rL would rise by 0.7(14 - 15) + 0.9(2 - 1) = $0.2
billion. Since T is assumed to have remained unaltered, the
aggregate concentration of profit (AC) would increase after
these changes by ($0.2 billion) / ir. We could state that, as long
as iris fixed, a rise in the value of a variable in which the &dquo;big
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economy&dquo; has a relatively high distributive share, coupled with
a compensatory decline in a variable in which it has a lower
distributive share, would have the net effect of raising the
aggregate concentration of profit (~C). In general, the impact of
relative-weight changes on AC is more complicated, depending
not only on the effect they have on 7r~, but also on how they
influence ir.
Equations (4a) and (4b) provide us with a quantitative tool for
describing a central aspect in the qualitative transformation of
Israel’s political economy. This is achieved by integrating the
country’s aggregate economic performance, as indicated by the
different components of civilian production, military
production, transfers and cost, together with the disaggregate
evolution of its underlying institutional arrangements, reflected
both in the distributive shares of the &dquo;big&dquo; and &dquo;small&dquo;
economies in each of the macroeconomic variables, as well as
in the aggregate concentration (and dispersion) of net profit.
The &dquo;macro&dquo; and &dquo;micro&dquo; histories of the Israeli economy
stemmed from the same structural transformation, in which
the archaic pre-state institutions of a &dquo;mixed economy&dquo;
gradually gave way to those of a mature, highly concentrated
economy, with a growing dual-market demarcation and a
persistent &dquo;military bias.&dquo; In this process, the compositional
shifts between components of the national accounts were
affected by the same forces that altered the overall distribution
of profit between the corporate core and periphery. Thus, the
temporal increase in the ratio of military to civilian production
(Dmil/Dciv), for example, must be seen as part of the same
historical process that also raised a3 and lowered a 1..
Furthermore, while these developments on the right-hand side
of Equation (4a) may have led to a higher aggregate
concentration of profit on the left-hand side, they were also
very much the consequences of higher concentration. Indeed,
one could conceivably argue that, without the differential
growth in the net profit of the &dquo;big economy,&dquo; there would have
been little or no &dquo;military bias&dquo; to begin with. Bearing these
considerations in mind, we turn now to examine the empirical
implications of our framework.
THE MODEL .
Most broadly, the analysis in this section seeks to clarify the
following three questions:
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1. Within the broader context of a closed
&dquo;national-accounting / dual-economy&dquo; model, how were
the separate business performances of the &dquo;big&dquo; and
&dquo;small&dquo; economies related to changes in the same
macroeconomic components? Specifically, did aggregate
variations in military and civilian production (as well as
in wage costs and various transfers) carry the same
implications for the net profit of the two corporate
groups, or were these influences different?
2. If given macroeconomic changes had different
consequences for the two dual-economy sectors, how
did they affect the differential accumulation process? In
particular, which macroeconomic categories tended, as
they changed, to augment the aggregate concentration
of profit? Which tended to abate it? And which have left
it unaltered?
3. Finally, given the pattern of these relationships, how
have the actual macroeconomic variations altered the
aggregate concentration of profit? Most importantly,
how significant was the gradual militarization of the
Israeli economy in that process?
To answer these questions, we turn from the identities of the
third section into the realm of econometric modelling. Before
doing so, however, we need to address two principal
difficulties. The first problem is one of instability. As noted
earlier, there is no reason for the distributional coefficients {ai’
p ~} to have remained stable over time. Indeed, one of the most
significant manifestations of Israel’s economic restructuring
was the changing relationships between the macroeconomic
variables on the one hand, and the profits of the &dquo;big&dquo; and
&dquo;small&dquo; economies on the other. So, seen from a long-term
perspective, these relationships were potentially nonstationary.
Unfortunately, there are no systematic data on the separate
activities of the &dquo;big&dquo; and &dquo;small&dquo; economies to help us identify
the nature of this non-stationarity. For instance, unlike in the
United States, the Israeli government publishes no data on
military contract awards. (In fact, there is no official or even
unofficial listing of the large military contractors in Israel.)
Similarly, there are no size breakdowns for the different
component of civilian production, transfers, taxes and costs.
The problem is not merely that the disaggregate data are not
made public, in order to preserve confidentiality, for example.
Based on what we were repeatedly told by top public officials
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and research directors at the Ministry of Finance, the Central
Bureau of Statistics and the Bank of Israel, these statistics
apparently do not exist at all. This lack of data is, of course,
why we need to turn to estimation in the first place, but that
also makes it difficult to specify the nature of parameter
change. In the absence of such prior knowledge, we solve the
problem by means of Chow Tests for structural change.
The second problem concerns the data on profit. As it stands,
there is no systematic information on the size distribution of
Israeli firms and that makes it difficult to separate n into its
two dual-economy components, nL and 1ts. (Despite it small
size and high corporate concentration, Israel’s national
accounts are mapped only from the expenditure side, and
there is no systematic breakdown of the income side. For a
detailed examination of Israeli data deficiencies, see Bichler
(1991). For our purpose here, however, the problem could be
readily solved by adopting a slightly different demarcation that
separates the business sector into the five core conglomerates
on the one hand, and all remaining firms on the other. Given
that the net profit of the large core and satellite corporations
tend to follow a similar temporal, the former could be used as
a reasonable proxy for variations in the net income of the
entire &dquo;big economy.&dquo; Moreover, under these conditions, an
index of aggregate profit concentration based on the
distributive share of the five core conglomerates will tend to
move together with a one based on the share of the &dquo;big
economy&dquo; as a whole. With this separation, the net profit of the
remaining &dquo;other&dquo; firms is, of course, somewhat less
meaningful because, in addition to the earnings of the &dquo;small
economy,&dquo; it also includes the profit of the satellite
corporations inside the &dquo;big economy.&dquo; (It should be
emphasized that, because the border line between the &dquo;big&dquo;
and &dquo;small&dquo; economies is always arbitrary to some extent, the
difficulty of separating them pervades all concentration
indexes, and would persist even if we knew the size
distribution of firms. In any case, making the satellite firms
part of the &dquo;small economy&dquo; creates a bias against confirming
our hypothesis about differential accumulation.)
These considerations require that we amend and reinterpret
the empirical counterparts of Equations (3a), (3b), (4a) and
(4b). Suppose for analysis of time-series, we specify two basic
empirical equations - one for the core corporations (5a) and
another for the &dquo;others&dquo; (5b) - such that
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where 7r, and 7r. are, respectively, the net profit of the five core
conglomerates and the &dquo;others,&dquo; {ai’ bi) are regression
coefficients assumed constant throughout some time period,
and {u, v} are stochastic errors. Note that, unlike the ai and 6i
parameters, which denote distributive shares, the slope
coefficients ai and bi represent the separate impact on 7T and
no of changes in the respective macroeconomic variables.
Because these macroeconomic changes may have opposite
effects on the profits of the core conglomerates and of the
&dquo;others,&dquo; the slope coefficients could be negative or exceed
.unity, though the sum (ai + bi) would still be one.18
Given the complementarity of our dual-economy framework,
we focus our empirical analysis only on one of these equations.
Using equation (5a), our conclusions would then pertain
specifically’to the core corporations and their relative position
within the business sector. Provided that the other large firms
shared a similar experience, these conclusions could then be
provisionally extended for the entire &dquo;big economy.&dquo; A more
systematic study with specific reference to the &dquo;small economy&dquo;
will have to wait until more detailed statistics become
available.
18To illustrate that possibility, suppose that there was an overall net
increase of 1 billion NIS in Military Production for Domestic Use (Dmil),
consisting of a rise in military production by the core corporations from
7 to 8.5 billion NIS, coupled with a contemporaneous reduction for the
"others" from 3 to 2.5 billion NIS. Everything else remaining the same,
the overall effect of this macroeconomic change would be to increase
business sector profit (&pi;) by 1 billion NIS. The disaggregate impact,
however, would be to raise the profits of the core (&pi;o) by 1.5 billion NIS
and to lower those of the "others" (&pi;o) by 0.5 billion NIS.
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S‘tn,tctural Change
Our data are annual and cover the period from 1966 to
1985. ~ 9 The nature of institutional restructuring over this time
span was, in many ways, continuous, but there was one
historical crossroad that signified a meaningful change in
direction, and which might have been associated with a
significant &dquo;structural change&dquo; in the values of regression
coefficients. This turning point was marked by the rise to
power in 1977 of the right-wing Likud bloc. Regardless of its
immediate causes, this political &dquo;earthquake&dquo; was the climax
of the open concentration process that began in the late 1960s:
the &dquo;mixed economy&dquo; was o~cially over and the newly declared
policy of laissez-faire meant that the large conglomerates could
henceforth reign supreme. How did this transition affect our
empirical equations? Which coefficients were subject to
structural change? Which of them remained relatively
unchanged?
In order to gain some initial insight into this transformation,
we examined individual scatter diagrams, each associating the
core’s profits Trc with a separate macroeconomic variable from
the right-hand side of Equation (5a). Such diagrams ignore the
concurrent effects on 7r,, of the other macroeconomic variables,
but they are often helpful in indicating major shifts in the
particular relationship under examination. Four of these
diagrams - those for Dciv, Xciv, Dmil and Td - suggested that,
sometime around 1977, there was a substantial change in the
relationship between each of these variables and TIc’ There was
no indication of a similar structural change in the diagrams for
Xmil, IDD, SUB and Wb. Thus, to the extent that there was a
structural change in 1977, we assume it affected only the
parameters for Dciv, Xmil, Dmil, Td and the intercept.
Based on these considerations, we formulate the core’s
augmented profit equation for the 1966-1985 period, as
follows:
19In 1986, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics altered its national
accounts definitions to be consistent with the 1968 recommendations of
the United Nations. Unfortunately, restated data go back only until 1980
and are hence insufficient for our purpose here. Moreover, given the
numerous differences between the previous and current definitions, there
is no simple way to augment our 1966-1985 data (which are based on the
earlier system) by the post-1985 figures that follow the new definitions.
77
where a suffix of 7 denotes the relevant variable until 1977
(inclusive) and a string of zeros thereafter, while a suK1x of 8
indicates a string of zeros until 1977 (inclusive) and the
relevant variable after that. In this equation, C is a unit
constant. The error term u represents the average effect on 1fc
of errors and omissions involved in estimating the
macroeconomic categories on the right-hand side. This error is
assumed to fulfill the standard requirements of the classical
linear regression model, including normality. In estimating, all
data were expressed in 1980 prices. Macroeconomic data are
from the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of
Finance. Profit data for the core conglomerates are from their
annual reports. Earnings for the &dquo;others&dquo; are imputed by
~ subtracting from the net income of the business sector the
corresponding figure for the core conglomerates. 20
Based on a series of relevant F-tests, we have tentatively
concluded that the structural change in 1977 was limited only
to the coefficients associated with Xciv, Dmil, and Td, and that
there was no structural change in the coefficient of Dciv. By
accepting the outcome of these F-tests, the final model for the
core firms is given by:
To maintain the general complementarity of slope coefficients
between the core conglomerates and the &dquo;others,&dquo; the
specification of Equation (7a) requires that we adopt a similar




Note: t-statistics are in brackets
P < 0.05 (two-tailed test) *
P < 0.01 (two-tailed test) **
P < 0.001 (two-tailed test) ***
formulation as the final model for the rest of the business
sector:
where (bi) are unknown coefficients and u is an error term.
Table 3 provides least-squares estimates for Equations (6), (7a)
and (7b), as well as indicating the arithmetic unit sum for
corresponding slope estimates in Equations (7a) and (7b).21
The results indicate that 9 of the 11 slope coefficients in the
core’s final Equation (7a) are significantly different from zero at
the 0.001 level, and only two have associated significance
levels higher than 0.05.22 The parameter estimates of Equation
(7a) also appear to be stable. We estimated this same equation
21Note that unit sums of estimates are not derived from constrained
estimation; they are rather a necessary consequence of the
national-accounting identities on which these equations are based.
22The value of 2.90 for the Durbin Watson statistics of Equation (7a)
indicates the possibility of a first-order autoregressive process for the
error term, such that ut = &rho;ut-1 + &xi;t, where &xi;t is "white noise." We
estimated equation (7a) with such an autoregressive correction, but there
were no meaningful changes in any of the parameters.
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with 18 different subsamples of our data set - each omitting
three different consecutive observations - and found that all
the coefficients remained fairly stationary (indeed, only one of
the 216 estimated slope-coefficients experienced a sign
reversal).
This stability seems to support our initial premise that we
could approximate the temporal non-linearity of the model by
allowing a single &dquo;structural change&dquo; in the otherwise
stationary parameters. Finally, interpreting the slope
coefficients of equations (7a) and (7b) as marginal distributive
shares (that is, the shares of the core and the &dquo;others&dquo; in the
change of the macroeconomic variable) means that the value of
corresponding pairs of coefficients should sum up to one, by
definition. 
’
Macroeconomic Changes and the Process of Differential
Accumulation
The final preparatory step is to set appropriate criteria for
testing the effect of macroeconomic changes on the aggregate
concentration of profit. Suppose each of the macroeconomic
variables is classified as &dquo;concentration-augmenting,&dquo; &dquo;con-
centration-neutral,&dquo; or &dquo;concentration-abating&dquo; - depending on
whether its associated slope coefficient ai exceeds, equals, or
falls short of the contemporaneous aggregate concentration of
profit (~r~/ ~, or minus g 7r for Td and Wb. In practice, the
designation of a variable in the three classes may change from
year to year. Here, however, we are limited to a comparison of
the estimated coefficients with the average ratio for aggregate
concentration during the period in which the parameter has
presumably remained stationary. Defining the &dquo;average
aggregate concentration&dquo; (AAC~ as the average n. ,/ 71 ratio
prevailing in time interval T, we adopt an amended terminology
based on the relationships between the value of coefficients
and the corresponding AAGLs. Thus, among those variables
which have a positive impact on the aggregate profit 7T (namely,
Dctv, Xciv, Dmil, Xmil, IDD and SUB), we could distinguish
between &dquo;concentration-augmenting,&dquo; &dquo;concentration-neutral&dquo;
and &dquo;concentration-abating&dquo; variables depending on whether ai
was greater than, equal to or smaller than AA Cr, respectively.
On the other hand, variables which have a negative impact on
n (that is, Td and LVb) should be classified as being
&dquo;concentration-augmenting,&dquo; &dquo;concentration-neutral&dquo; or &dquo;con-
centration-abating&dquo; if ai was smaller than, equal to or greater
than AA Cr.
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The values of AACI. in our sample were 0.026 for the
1966-1977 period, 0.143 for the 1978-1985 period, and 0.073
for the entire 1966-1985 period. Using these as relevant
benchmarks, we tested the hypotheses that individual
parameters were equal to the average aggregate concentration
of profit over the relevant period. If, based on the F-test, any
null hypothesis could not be rejected, we concluded that the
variable had no definite effect on the concentration process,
and was, therefore, concentration-neutral. If the null
hypothesis was rejected, however, we concluded that the
variable was concentration-augmenting or concentration-
abating, depending on whether the estimated coefficient was
greater or smaller than AACT. as described above.
The Historical Restructuring of the Israeli Economy: An
Empirical Assessment
Restated briefly, our goal is to assess the structural role of
broad macroeconomic developments, particularly those related
to the &dquo;military bias&dquo; of Israeli industry. Operationally, we seek
to examine (1) the extent to which macroeconomic changes had
different effects on the profits of the &dquo;big&dquo; and &dquo;small&dquo;
, 
economies, (2) the direction in which such macroeconomic
changes tended to influence the process of differential
accumulation and resulting aggregate concentration of profit
and (3) the combined impact of parameter differentials and
macroeconomic compositional shifts on the historical
progression of aggregate concentration. We begin with the first
two questions, which depend on the values of estimated
parameters and could be addressed together, and then turn to
the third question, which relates to the values of both
estimated coefficients and regression variables. (In assessing
our findings, we focus primarily on the core’s equation. The
results for the &dquo;others&dquo; satisfy the unity requirement for the
slope coefficients [ai + b~J.)
1. Civilian Production. Based on the F-tests, both Civilian
Production for Domestic Use (Dciu) and Civilian Production for
Export (Xciu) appear to be concentration-abating variables.
Indeed, the coefficient estimates for the two variables are
negative, which means that increases in each of these
macroeconomic categories tended to reduce the profits of the
core conglomerates. According to equation (7a), the structural
change occurring in 1977 lowered the Xciv coefficient from
-0.13 to 
-0.21, thus further intensifying the concentration-
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abating effect of this variable. (The corresponding coefficient
estimates for the &dquo;others&dquo; are all positive.)
This evidence suggests that increases in the macroeconomic
magnitude of civilian production were brought about by a
combination of even larger increases for the &dquo;small economy,&dquo;
coupled with declines in the &dquo;big economy.&dquo; In fact, this kind of
structural divergency seems to characterize the dynamics of
most macroeconomic categories in our modell (Of the 11 slope
parameters, only the coefficients of Dmil7, DmilB, Xmil, IDD and
Td 8 exhibit the same sign for the core and for the &dquo;others.&dquo;)
This pattern may be typical to a stagnant economy with strong
distributional coalitions, and it reinforces our emphasis on the
need for disaggregate analysis.
2. Military Production. In contrast to civilian production,
changes in military production tended to be concentration-
augmenting, particularly since the late 1970s. The estimated
coefficient for Dmil7 is 0.018, and since an F test indicates that
this was not significantly different from AAC66_~~, we conclude
that, between 1966 and 1977, Military Production for Domestic
Use was concentration-neutral. (The estimated marginal effect
of Dmil7 on the &dquo;others&dquo; profit was 0.98.) In the subsequent
1978-1985 interval, however, there was a dramatic increase in
the effect of this variable on the core’s profit. The estimated
marginal coefficient for DmilB is 0.89, significantly different
from AA G~8_85 according to our F test, so we conclude that
Military Production for Domestic Use in that period became
concentration-augmenting. (The corresponding estimate for the
&dquo;others&dquo; dropped to 0.11.) Based on Equation (7a), Military
Production for Export (Xmil) was concentration-augmenting
during the entire sample period. The estimate for this variable
is 0.74, tested to be significantly different from AAC66-85- (The
corresponding estimate for the &dquo;others&dquo; coefficient is 0.26.)
These findings suggest that, during the first period between
1966 and 1977, the neutral effect ofDmj7 on concentration was
counteracted by the positive effect of Xmil, and, as we
demonstrate later in this section, the combined effect of the
two military-production categories was concentration-
augmenting. This combined positive effect intensified after the
structural change of 1977, when Dmil, too, became
concentration-augmenting.
So far, these conclusions regarding civilian and military
production are consistent with our basic hypothesis about the
positive link between the &dquo;military bias&dquo; of the Israeli economy
and its aggregate concentration. The &dquo;military bias&dquo; since the
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early 1970s occurred through a relative decline in civilian
activity as opposed to military-related production (Figure 1),
and if our findings are generally correct, this relative shift must
have contributed to the process of differential accumulation
and consequent increase in the aggregate concentration of net
profit. Before we assess this effect more closely, however, it is
necessary to examine the marginal effect on concentration of
the other macroeconomic variables in our model.
3. Government-Business Transfers. In general, changes in
R3D, SLTB and Td seem to have had different and often opposite
effects on the net profit of the core conglomerates and of the
&dquo;others.&dquo; The estimated marginal effect of IDD on the core’s
profits is 0.55, and based on an F-test, we conclude that
Interest Payments on the Domestic Debt were
concentration-augmenting. (The comparable estimate for the
&dquo;others&dquo; is 0.45.) In light of the fact that the domestic debt in
Israel was financed almost exclusively by the large institutional
investors of the &dquo;big economy,&dquo; this inference about the
concentration-augmenting effect of IDD should hardly be
surprising.
The estimated marginal impact of Business Subsidies (SUfI
- on net profit is negative for the core conglomerates (-0.40) and
positive for the &dquo;others&dquo; (1.40), and this variable was F-tested
to be concentration-abating. To see why this should be so, note
that, because they include the &dquo;small economy,&dquo; the &dquo;others&dquo;
topically have lower profit margins on sales than the core
conglomerates, which in turn implies that the rate of aggregate
concentration for sales is lower than the corresponding
aggregate concentration for profit. If subsidies are
proportionate to sales (rather than to profit), and if that
proportion is roughly similar for the two sectors, it follows that
increases in such subsidies are bound to reduce the aggregate
concentration of profit.23 It must be noted, however, that, in
addition to direct subsidies associated with specific products,
the Israeli government also provides subsidized loans to
particular companies. The subsidy component of these loans
23For example, suppose that the rate of aggregate concentration for
sales is 0.2, the rate of aggregate concentration for profit is 0.4, and
subsidies are proportionate to sales. Under these conditions, an increase
of 1 NIS in SUB will raise the net profit of the "others" by 0.8 NIS and that
of the core by 0.2, thus lowering the rate of aggregate concentration for
profit below its initial level of 0.4.
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is not included in our SUB variable, but we could be fairly
certain that its effect on profits is concentration-augmenting,
simply because most of the subsidized loans go to the &dquo;big
economy. 
&dquo;24
The effect of Direct Business Taxes changed significantly
between the two periods. Until 1977, Td was F tested to be
concentration-augmenting. Moreover, with an estimated
coefficient of 0.26 in Equation (7a), increases in this variable
probably had a positive effect on the profits of the core
conglomerates. (The comparable estimated effect for the
&dquo;others&dquo; was 
-1.26.) This evidence is again consistent with our
emphasis on the process of redistribution underlying
macroeconomic changes. Within a rigid institutional structure,
a small increase (decrease) in overall business taxes could be
the sum of a large increase (decrease) in the taxes of the
&dquo;others,&dquo; coupled with a decline (rise) in the taxes paid by the
large core conglomerates. From 1978 onward, however, the
&dquo;core&dquo; coefficient dropped to -0.63 as Direct Business Taxes
became concentration-abating, based on an F test. One
possible explanation is that, during that period, the
&dquo;small-economy&dquo; tax base was shrinking, thus shifting the
marginal tax burden onto the &dquo;big economy.&dquo; Unfortunately,
the size distribution of business taxes is not available, so these
speculations could not be verified.
4. Labor Cost. Another dual-economy divergence appears in
the coefficient estimates associated with Business-Sector
Wages and Salaries (Wb). The estimated value for the core is
0.074 (-1.074 for the &dquo;others&dquo;). All in all, changes in Wb were
F-tested to be concentration-augmenting. The interpretation of
these findings is, again, that aggregate changes tend to conceal
conflicting movements in the underlying shares of the core and
the &dquo;others.&dquo; In the Israeli context, these divergent movements
may have been related to the dichotomy between the
24Data on the subsidy component of government loans are available
only since 1975 and hence could not be used in our model. Furthermore,
these data are imputed. They are based on the difference between the
government and market rates of interests, assuming that the latter
represents an equilibrium between the competitive supply and
competitive demand for funds. Unfortunately, with Israeli capital markets
being completely dominated by the government and the large
conglomerates, the "market" rate of interest may have little to do with
competitive equilibrium, so this kind of imputation has no clear
theoretical meaning.
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Palestinian labor force of the &dquo;small economy&dquo; and the Jewish
labor force of the &dquo;big economy,&dquo; as proposed by Farjoun ( 1978,
1980, 1983). One fundamental difference between these two
groups has been the pattern of their wage changes. While the
average real wage of Jewish employees increased more or less
steadily between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, that of
the Palestinian workers tended to fluctuate Professor-cyclically
with the economy’s rate of growth. Now, to the extent that
these latter fluctuations were the primary source of short-term
variations in the overall wage bill, the result for our equations
would have been to make the negative impact of Wb on the
&dquo;small-economy&dquo; profit disproportionately large. In other words,
everything else remaining the same, increases in the total wage
bill of the business sector would tend to reduce the net profit
of the &dquo;others&dquo; by more than they reduce those of the core
conglomerates. Also, if implicit in the overall increase (decline)
of wages , there was a decline (increase) in the wage bill of the
core, the associated slope coefficient for this sector could even
become positive, as we found in our estimates.
Our conclusions so far were concerned only with patterns of
relationship, as indicated by the size and temporal variations
~ 
of the slope parameters. In order to complete our analysis,
however, it is also necessary to examine the effect on aggregate
concentration of the actual evolution of the macroeconomic
variables. Using a broad classification in which we group
together the macroeconomic variables belonging to civilian
production (Dciv, XciU7 and Xc!L’<3), military production (Dmil7,
Dmi7<S and Xrrzio, government-business transfers (IDD, SUB, Td 7
and Td8) and labor cost (Wb), and adding a fifth classification




Estimated Contributions to the Aggregate
Concentration of Net Profits
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel; coefficient estimates from
equation (7a).
where Ai is the estimated value of a~ in equation (7a), as
reported in Table 3. The sum of these five variables is simply
the &dquo;predicted&dquo; aggregate concentration of profit (Jrc! 71), based
on these estimated parameters and the actual values for the
carriers of equation (7a). From this perspective, the combined
variables listed above could be viewed as representing
approximate relative &dquo;contributions&dquo; to the annual rate of
aggregate profit concentration. Specifically, CiuP denotes the
combined estimated contribution of civilian production, MilP
designates the combined estimated contribution of
military-related activity, 7YfP signifies the combined estimated
contribution of government-business transfers, WbP represents
the estimated contribution of wage cost, and IctP is simply the
ratio of the sum of intercepts and 7T. The annual values for
these combined variables (expressed as percent of 1t) are
plotted in Figure 3.
In evaluating the historical picture emerging from these data,
our concern is of course only with variations, not absolute
magnitudes. The most significant impact on the process of
differential accumulation, particularly since the mid-1970s,
originated from changes occurring in the areas of civilian and
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military production. During the first period of relative
prosperity between 1966 and 1977, the most dynamic category
was that of civilian production. In the subsequent 1978-1985
period, with the economy reverting into aggregate stagnation,
there were marked increases in the variations of the different
&dquo;contributions,&dquo; with some variables tending to raise the
aggregate concentration of profit and others tending to lower it.
While the standard deviation for WbP fell somewhat, that of
7YfP almost doubled. The most substantial increases in
variability, however, occurred in civilian production and even
more so in military-related activity.
Our main conclusion then, is that there was indeed an
intimate link between the &dquo;military bias&dquo; of the Israeli economy
and the increasing concentration of profit. While changes in
interest payments on the domestic debt, subsidies, business
taxes and labor cost have all affected the differential nature of
accumulation, the primary root of that process was the
fundamental structural transformation from civilian to
military-related profitability. This &dquo;military bias&dquo; evolved in two
related ways. First, since the end of the &dquo;Palestinian boom,&dquo;
military spending became the principal means of redistributing
. profit from the &dquo;small&dquo; to the &dquo;big economy.&dquo; The negative
impact on the core’s profit of changes in civilian spending and
the positive impact of increases in military spending help to
explain the gradual diversion of the large conglomerates from
civilian ’ to military-related activity. This restructuring
intensified after 1977, when the disparities in profitability grew
even further. These developments were also associated with a
second, parallel transformation. The increasing reliance of the
big conglomerates on profits coming from military as opposed
to civilian production has contributed to the changing balance
between these two sectors. While both military and civilian
production were rising in real terms, their ratio was slowly
increasing, as illustrated in Figure 1. In other words, the
&dquo;military bias&dquo; consisted of a dual process, involving on the one
hand a divergence between rising military profitability and
falling civilian profitability, and on the other hand a relative
increase in the size of the military as opposed to civilian sector
of the Israeli economy.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our basic point of departure in this paper was that, in a
mature capitalist economy, the evolution of military spending
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must be understood in conjunction with business
restructuring, particularly the process of differential
accumulation. Examining the &dquo;model&dquo; case of Israel, we
adopted a dual-economy perspective that distinguished the
large conglomerates of the &dquo;big economy&dquo; from the rest of the
business sector, and argued that the increase since the late
1960s in the share of net profit earned by the core
conglomerates was positively related to a progressive &dquo;military
bias&dquo; of Israeli industry. In evaluating this link, our goal was
not to identify the &dquo;determinants&dquo; of aggregate profit
concentration, or the inevitable &dquo;laws of motion&dquo; that govern
military spending. Instead, we chose a non-deterministic
perspective, arguing that the evolution of military expenditures
and the process of differential accumulation were two sides of
the same historical transformation affecting Israeli society. To
study the nature of this transformation, we developed a
self-contained analytical framework integrating the distribution
of net profit on the micro level, with compositional shifts in the
national accounts on the macro level.
Econometric estimates and tests based on this framework
tended to confirm our central hypothesis. In general, the
regression results showed that the long-term increase in the
ratio of military to civilian production was indeed closely
correlated with the growing concentration of net profit.
Military-related production was expanding most rapidly during
the late 1960s and early 1970s but, given that civilian
economic activity was still much larger, the effect of this
&dquo;military bias&dquo; on the aggregate concentration of profit was
relatively limited. Since the mid-1970s, however, with the
Israeli economy entering its &dquo;monopolistic&dquo; phase, civilian
production reverted to chronic stagnation, steering the large
distributional coalitions of the &dquo;big economy&dquo; deeper into the
military sector. These conclusions are, of course, more
suggestive than definitive, and further research is both needed
and welcome, but the potential of this line of analysis - for
Israel, as well as for other industrial countries - is clearly
promising.
Incidentally, our findings in this paper may shed new light on
the debated link between military spending and economic
growth. Participants who focused primarily on developing
countries, such as Benoit (1973, 1978), claimed that military
expenditures have had a positive influence on economic
growth, whereas those who concentrated more on the
experience of developed economies, like Smith (1977, 1978,
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1980), contended that these expenditures were in fact
detrimental to prosperity. One reason why the views of Benoit
and Smith could not be easily reconciled was that both argued
in aggregate terms and failed to consider underlying structural
differences. Indeed, when we add this extra dimension in the
case of Israel, the apparently contradictory perspectives of
Benoit and Smith become in fact complementary to one
another. During the 1950s and much of the 1960s, Israel
appears to fit the context described by Benoit, with rapid
economic growth propagated by militarization. This occurred
both directly, through the multiplier effect of military spending,
as well as indirectly via the accompanying &dquo;socialization&dquo; of
new immigrants, technological spillovers and the growth of
managerial know-how. The period since the late 1960s,
however, begins to show the symptoms described by Smith.
During the 1970s and 1980s, military budgets no longer
propped the economy, and instead brought larger debts and
growing stagnation. Now, if we follow the central thesis of this
paper, then this reversal must be attributed, at least in part,
to the changing structure of the Israeli economy. Until the late
1960s, the Israeli business sector was still relatively dispersed,
and in that context, military expenditures (together with
’ 
expanding populations) were conducive to growth. Gradually,
however, the process of corporate concentration created an
increasingly rigid structure of &dquo;distributional coalitions,&dquo; which,
from the, early 1970s onward, turned military spending into a
stagnationary economic force.
This regime of &dquo;militarized stagnation&dquo; lasted more than a
decade, roughly until the late 1980s, and the apparent
reluctance to change it must have been affected by the
heightened dependency of the &dquo;big economy&dquo; on
military-related profits. In a certain sense, the whole process
became self-propagating: the ongoing rise in the ratio of
military to civilian production contributed toward an
ever-growing concentration of profit; this augmented the
political-economic power of the large conglomerates, which
were then in a better position to promote larger defense
budgets. Of course, this circularity does not mean that the
process could have continued indefinitely and, indeed, by the
late 1980s, after more than two decades of an intense &dquo;military
bias,&dquo; Israel appeared to have entered a new political phase.
The escalating Intifada brought a greater recognition of the
Palestinian problem and, with the end of the Cold War, this
eventually culminated in a substantial shift toward a
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conciliatory foreign policy. Interestingly, however, the causes
for this transition and the prospects for its future success
remain dependent on the same structural considerations that
also underlay the earlier process of militarization.2s
As long as the &dquo;military-bias&dquo; benefits for the large
conglomerates outweighed their share in the macroeconomic
cost of stagnation, they had little or no interest in reverting to
a peace economy. Yet, in order for the military-dependent
profits of these firms to continue and rise faster than the
economy’s average, the militarization of Israeli industry had to
intensify, and that, of course, could not go on forever. Indeed,
since the late 1980s, some of the large firms began to have
second thoughts about the merits of a war economy. With the
government’s growing fiscal crisis, the ratio of military to
civilian production began to level off indicating that the
militarization process may have reached its upper limit. Also,
by that time, the core conglomerates were becoming too large
for their domestic market and, in seeking expansion, started to
see the potential advantages of Middle East integration. In this
light, it is then not surprising that, after the beginning of the
Intifada in 1987, the large corporations in Israel started to
publicly promote the benefits of regional reconciliation. Such
support must have weighed heavily in the recent Israeli change
of heart about an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, and will
remain crucial if the Israeli-Arab peace process is to succeed.
From this perspective, one may be even tempted to recommend
that the large firms be made the principal &dquo;peace-profiteers,&dquo;
so as to assure their continued interest in demilitarization.
Indeed, if we could reverse the structural role of military and
civilian production, making the former concentration-abating
and the latter concentration-augmenting, we may be able to
turn the Israeli &dquo;big economy&dquo; into the best ally of peace.
Failing to move in this direction would then leave a constant
temptation to revert back to rising military budgets.
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